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Expenses of Last Illness
One of the issues in Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder1
was whether the privilege for expenses of last illness 2 attached
to hospital charges for room and board, X-ray and laboratory
services, drugs, dressings, oxygen, blood-typing, and transfusion
charges. The trial court held there was a privilege, but this was
reversed by the court of appeal.8 This denial of the privilege was
grounded on the rule of stricti juris as applied to privileges and
on the absence of hospital charges in the enumeration listed in
Civil Code article 3202.4 The supreme court 5 disagreed with this
reasoning on the basis of (1) the text of article 3191 (3), which
establishes a privilege for "charges, of whatever nature, occa-
sioned by the last sickness," (2) the judicial interpretation by a
court of appeal that "article 3202 is not definitive but illustra-
tive,"6 and (3) a number of other appellate decisions which rec-
ognized a privilege for hospital charges.7 The supreme court's
decision on this point is correct and its soundness is confirmed
by noting that the same conclusion was reached in France. s It is
important that the supreme court did settle and stabilize the law
on this question, even though the final decision was against the
plaintiff on an issue of liberative prescription which is discussed
elsewhere in this symposium.9
Crop Pledge
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Marksville Elevator Co.1 involved
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 253 La. 697, 219 So.2d 500 (1969).
2. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3191, 3199-3204.
3. 208 So.2d 355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3202: "The expenses of the last sickness comprehend
the fees of physicians and surgeons, the wages of nurses, and the price due
to the apothecary for medicines supplied by him to the deceased for his per-
sonal use during his last illness."
5. Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 219 So.2d 500 (1969).
6. Dinnat v. Succession of Lewis, 8 La. App. 820 (1928).
7. See references cited in Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder, 253
La. 697, 703 n.5, 219 So.2d 500, 503 n.5 (1969).
8. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATIsE, no. 2560 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959);
2 CoLIN & CAPrTANT, COURS Dm DROIT CIvIL FANgAis, no. 1498 at 946 (10th ed.
1948).
9. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-
Prescription, 30 LA. LAW REv. 236 (1970).
10. 221 So.2d 853 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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several issues incident to a recorded crop pledge. The sufficiency
of the property description and the identification of the crop as
produced thereon are factual issues for particularization in each
case, and the personal liability of the third party purchaser is
already well established," as is also the utilization of the crop
pledge to secure past debts as well as present and future debts.
With reference to the identification of the specific crop with the
advances made for its production, the court took a clear position
on what may be a new point of law to the effect that the recorded
crop pledgee "is not required to oversee that the money is actually
used for such purpose, nor required to prove it was so used."' 2
Another point made in this decision is that the "debt" secured
by a recorded crop pledge includes the interest and the usually
stipulated attorney's fees.
BUILDING CONTRACT PRIVILEGES
Pringle Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes was a case in
which the trial court was reversed by the court of appeal;13 this
in turn was reversed on first hearing by the supreme court14 but
affirmed on rehearing. 15 The question was whether legal subro-
gation operated in favor of a subcontractor who had paid his
laborers, so as to let him claim a laborer's privilege against the
property. The issue of subrogation is very thoroughly and well
discussed in the court of appeal opinion and in the supreme court
affirmance on rehearing with the conclusion that there is no such
subrogation. From the point of view of the building contract law,
this conclusion fits in with the policy objectives of the statute
which necessarily exclude the idea of such subrogation. An ob-
stacle in the path of the conclusion reached was the prior supreme
court decision to the contrary in Tilly v. Bauman;'6 but when
carefully reexamined, the supreme court put it aside as "un-
sound."
In Courshon v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc.,17 the First Circuit
Court of Appeal sitting en banc had to decide inter alia the scope
of advances which could be secured by the mortgage which
11. See references cited id. at 855.
12. Id. at 858.
13. 208 So.2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
14. Pringle Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 226 So.2d 502 (La. 1969).
15. Id. at 513.
16. 174 La. 71, 139 So. 762 (1932).
17. 219 So.2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 219 So.2d 778 (Ia.
1969).
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primed suppliers' privileges under the private building contract
law. It was contended that the priority given to this mortgage
was limited to the security of advances for direct use in the con-
struction project. Since the case came under the factual situation
(construction contract not recorded) governed by R.S. 9:4812,
and since the statutory text provided the priority for "a bona fide
mortgage . . . duly recorded before the labor or work is begun
or any material is furnished," the court properly concluded that
there was no basis to qualify or limit the mortgage or the purpose
of the advances as long as the mortgage is bona fide and pre-
viously recorded.
In this rehearing, the court retracted all views and conclu-
sions expressed in the judgment on first hearing's with reference
to the interpretation of R.S. 9:4801, which governs the fact situ-
ation where a building contract and bond have been duly re-
corded. The textual provision of R.S. 9:4801 (C) 19 is more specific
about the nature of the advances included in the security of the
priority mortgage. In view of the substantial difference of lan-
guage in these two sections of the same statute, it can hardly be
said that there is exactly the same legislative intent in the diver-
gent provisions.
MORTGAGES
For some time there was uncertainty about the effective date
of a collateral mortgage as against third persons. A strong con-
tention existed that it was effective for ranking purposes as of
the date of recordation regardless of the subsequent dates of
which advances were actually made or the mortgage reissued.
The question was set to rest by the decision in Odom v. Cherokee
Homes, Inc.: 2
18. See Courshon v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 219 So.2d 254 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1968).
19. LA. R.S. 9:4801(C) (1950): "When a mortgage note has been executed
by the owner of the immovable for the purpose of securing advances to be
made either simultaneously therewith or in the future, whether such advances
be for the payment of all or part of the purchase price of the property, for
commitment fees or any other type of expenses incurred or to be incurred
in connection with construction on the property, and the mortgage has been
recorded and the note delivered to the lender before any work or labor has
begun or material has been furnished, or before the recordation of a building
contract, the amount of the advances made simultaneously therewith or
thereafter shall be deemed secured by the mortgage in precedence to and
with priority over any of the claims had under the privileges conferred by
Sub-section (A) of this section, except as stated In Sub-section (D) hereof."
20. 165 So.2d 855, 865 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 868,
167 So.2d 667 (1964).
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"[T]he lien of a collateral mortgage dates from the date
of issuance or reissuance of the note identified with it and not
from the date of recordation of the mortgage. The lien is
regarded as being suspended insofar as third persons are
concerned during any period in which the note remains un-
issued in the possession of the mortgagor or during any period
between the extinguishment of a debt which the note is
pledged to secure, and its repledge as security for another
debt. The lien of the mortgage revives upon the repledge
of the note and dates from that day."
From this it follows that the first recorded collateral mort-
gage will outrank a later recorded collateral mortgage only to
the extent that an actual indebtedness exists under the former
prior to the actual indebtedness under the latter. This point is
not clearly treated in the recent case of Wallace v. Fidelity Natl
Bank,21 in which the court's opinion focuses primarily on the
validity of the pledges of the respective mortgage notes, giving
priority according to the relative dates of perfection of the
pledges. In the actual facts of the Wallace case, the result is not
inconsistent with the Odom rule, but it would be regrettable if
the analysis and language of the Wallace case created any new
uncertainty in connection with the effective date for ranking
purposes of the collateral mortgage. It is to be noted that in re-
fusing a writ, the supreme court added, "The result is correct. 22
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Ideal Loan of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson2 8 involved the
adequacy of a chattel mortgage description which is essential for
its validity. The majority of the court distinguished between the
degree of description required for the effectiveness of the chattel
mortgage against third persons and that which suffices between
the parties. For the latter, the court's statement that "only a
general description of the chattels is necessary '24 is supported
only by a reference to American Jurisprudence, which is like-
wise the sole authority given for the proposition "all descriptions
must be construed in view of the general principle that it is pre-
21. 219 So.2d 342 (La. App. lt Cir. 1969).
22. Wallace v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 253 La. 1083, 221 So.2d 517 (1969).
23. 218 So.2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
24. Id. at 636.
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sumed the mortgagor intended to confer some benefit on the
mortgagee."
The Chattel Mortgage Act requires adequate description as
an essential for the validity of this security device and makes
no distinction whether as against third persons or as between the
parties.2 1 The statute also assimilates chattel mortgages to Civil
Code immovable mortgages,2 6 for which description is an essen-
tial requirement without distinction as to the immediate parties
or third persons.2
The meaning and purpose of the description requirement are
to make possible the seizure in event of foreclosure and to iden-
tify the object seized as the identical object described in the
mortgage.28
The chattel mortgage in question enumerated a number of
household items, concluding with the phrase "together with all
other furniture, fixtures and contents located on the premises."
As to this part of the description, the court properly ruled it in-
sufficient, but the majority sustained mortgage validity as to the
other items, such as "one bed.., one dresser... one refrigerator,
one washing machine." This gives the statute a liberality of in-
terpretation which is undue and excessive; there is nothing in
the document to identify the bed or the refrigerator as the actual
things chattel-mortgaged because either of these items (or any
of the others listed without description) could just as well be
replacements for the original ones which might have been dis-
carded. A list of things is an "enumeration," not a "description."
The one group of items for which there is anything in the
nature of description was "one living room set consisting of: one
green sofa, two matching chairs, one end table, one coffee table";
the dissenting judge's acceptance of the words "green" and
"matching" as possibly satisfying the description requirement is
more like a measure of generosity in a reluctant compromise
than the strict application of the legal principles well stated in
that opinion.
25. LA. R.S. 9:5352 (1950).
26. Id. 9:5363.
27. See Ideal Loan of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson, 218 So.2d 634, 636
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
28. LA. R.S. 9:5352 (1950): ". . . a full description of the property to be
mortgaged shall be set forth so that it may be identified ......
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Finally, instead of referring to American Jurisprudence, it
would have been more relevant to cite Civil Code article 3183,
which provides:
"The property of the debtor is the common pledge of his
creditors, and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed
among them ratably, unless there exist among the creditors
some lawful causes of preference." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, any preference given to any creditor, by reason of
a privilege or mortgage of any kind, is an exception to the general
rule of proration, and full compliance with all the respective re-
quirements must be met for validity between the parties as well
as for effectiveness against third persons.
In First Nat'l Bank in Mansfield v. Lawrence,-9 where the
holder of a second chattel mortgage (on certain drilling rigs)
had actual knowledge of the existence of a prior chattel mort-
gage on the same things, the court held that the holder of the
first chattel mortgage was relieved of a literal compliance with
the law concerning registry. A writ of review was granted,3
but on motion of both mortgagees the writ was "recalled, dis-
solved and dismissed."3'
It is regrettable that this question did not receive full con-
sideration and decision by the supreme court. When the chattel
mortgage law was overhauled and reenacted in 1944,82 the phrase
"in order to affect third persons without notice" was changed to
read "in order to affect third persons," omitting the last two
words. This change, together with the provision which assimilates
chattel mortgages to Civil Code immovable mortgages wherever
appropriate,33 . must be taken to mean something like the appli-
cation of the public records doctrine rather than to have no
meaning at all. Yet there has been some jurisprudence looking
in this latter direction34 and it would have been well to have a
full consideration of the matter by the supreme court.
29. 207 So.2d 907 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
30. First Nat'l Bank in Mansfield v. Lawrence, 251 La. 1082, 208 So.2d 537
(1968).
31. First Nat'l Bank in Mansfield v. Lawrence, 253 La. 54, 216 So.2d 304
(1968).
32. La. Acts 1944, No. 172, now LA. R.S. 9:5353 (1950).
33. LA. R.S. 9:5363 (1950).
34. See cases cited in First Nat'l Bank in Mansfield v. Lawrence, 207
So.2d 907 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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